Monday, October 15, 2007

Freshman Inanity at Yale

Note: This post is copied from my former blog The Natural Skeptic. I reposted it for future reference.

This month seems to be the month for poorly written opinion pieces at college newspapers. My school had one concerning same-sex marriage, and Ohio University had blatant racism flash their student newspaper. Now, a freshman at Yale places a foot in his mouth concerning atheism and its "lack" of morality.

He writes:
Christians and other theists have raised the objection that naturalistic materialism — the notion that only the physical world exists — can provide no foundation for morality. That’s not to say that naturalists cannot behave morally, but merely that they can have no real and consistent reason for behaving morally. As this has been a long-standing and widespread objection to naturalism, it would seem only reasonable to expect atheists to devote careful attention to the question of morality.
Atheistic philosophers have, indeed, spent time describing a naturalistic morality. Where has this kid been? Our moral tendency develops as a result of our ability to possess empathy toward others. It is a natural human condition to project oneself into the situations experienced by others, because chances are we have experienced said situation. Our knowledge grew not from revelation or "magic" but by human experiences and human observation. We know stealing requires removing possession of property from one individual to another. We know rape involves sexual penetration and violence. We know the result of murder is the vanquishing of a life. We have experience and knowledge of the results and outcomes of given circumstances.

Morality is nothing more or a less than a reflection of knowledge. It is not a gene, and it is not a a deus ex machina. I find it a bit repugnant to declare that the sole reason beings are moral is due to posthumous judgment by a mythical being who supposedly walked the earth and floated into the sky or any other fancy mythology one can contrive. I act righteously because I have the ability to discern how the other individual desires to be treated. I act according to the law because that is what I accept as being a citizen of the nation. No need to call forth Jesus, Zeus, or any other deity of desire.

Concerning our ability to choose to act rightly or wrongly, the author writes:
C.S. Lewis puts the matter nicely: “If a man asks what is the point of behaving decently, it is no good replying, ‘in order to benefit society,’ for trying to benefit society, in other words being unselfish (for ‘society’ after all only means ‘other people’), is one of the things decent behaviour consists in; all you are really saying is that decent behaviour is decent behaviour.”
You are certainly free to disobey the moral tendency and do wrong and violence on to others. However, with every wrong committed a person exists who desires justice for the wrong. Hence, our morality stems from the social contract, an extension of our human empathy.

The freshmen enters into the famous is-ought paradigm: "naturalistic materialism gives no basis for this ought." Indeed, no such system has a true basis for an ought, and he is blinded to think religion does. The simple existence of a system or parameter does not necessitate the individual to follow said parameter. In the Christian tradition, no one is forced to act morally, that is there is no forced reason to commit oneself to ought statements. It is only inner volition which causes one to follow the oughts prescribed by Christianity, Judaism, or any other flavor of theism imaginable. Why limit the is-ought problem to only naturalism when it equally applies across the board? As stated previously, the individual can fall outside of the bell curve for following the natural moral tendency, but our social order determines the reaction to this individual's actions. Again, the social contract is held.

The author fails to convince the reader that morality is dependent upon God. The onus is on him to demonstrate how theism transverses the is-ought problem of philosophy. I am content with my naturalistic morality and its source, and I am content following the ought parameters established. I have no need to call forth supernatural entities to determine not to kill, to bathe every day, and to conserve energy and materials. Does the author only act morally because he is afraid of the lake of fire? What a prick to act out of fear of the unknowable and unseen and then condemn those who act due to their knowledge of the world and humanity.

No comments: